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I. INTRODUCTION
America's fast-paced and convenience-driven society demands im-
mediate gratification. Advanced technology attempts to fulfill society's
needs by providing new and improved communication mediums.' In par-
ticular, many Americans have entered the cellular superhighway hoping
that it can keep pace with their ever-growing demands.
Cellular telephone usage has become commonplace in American so-
ciety. Since their inception and integration into mainstream America,3
cellular telephones have become astoundingly popular.4 The excitement
over this portable communication device continues to escalate and shows
no signs of abating.5 Because of this, the cellular superhighway perpetu-
6ally expands both in capacity and geographical coverage.
Convenience, however, has its price.7 The demand for portable
1. See Penney Gill, Buck Rogers, Businessperson: Hybrids Like Pager/Cell Phones,
Carry 21st Century Promise, HOME FURNISHINGS NEWSPAPER, Jan. 1, 1996, at 1. Some
examples of recently developed wireless communication devices include two-way
communications products, voice-to-data transmission devices, pagers, wireless
modems, and cellular phones. See id.
2. See Nicholas Baran, Privatization of Telecommunications, MONTHLY REv., July
17, 1996, at 1 (discussing the great telecommunications opportunities the "infor-
mation highway" promises to offer).
3. See Jaymes D. Littlejohn, The Impact of Land Use Regulation on Cellular
Communications: Is Federal Preemption Warranted?, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 247, 249
(1993) (citing D.L. Huff, Advanced Mobile Phone Service: The Developmental System,
58 BELL Sys. TECH. J. 249, 251 (1979)). The first developmental test for the cellu-
lar communications system occurred in 1978 in Chicago. In the test's initial stage,
a mere 2000 portable phones were in existence. See id.
4. See Haya El Nasser, Crossed Signals: Cities Object to Cell Towers, USA TODAY,
Nov. 14, 1996, at A3. The number of cellular phone subscribers has skyrocketed
from 500,000 subscribers a mere 10 years ago to more than 38 million subscribers
today. See id.
5. See Towering Controversies, GOVERNING, Feb. 1996, at 37, 37. It is reported
that from mid-1994 to mid-1995, the demand for cellular phone service increased
58%. See id.
6. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 248.
7. See, e.g., Cheryl Martinis, Growth in Cell Phones Raises Towering Issue in
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phone services has spurred the development of cellular towers that now
dot the landscape. 8 In 1983, fewer than 350 cellular sites existed in the
United States.9 Today, over 19,000 sites exist,"0 and industry figures sug-
gest that by the year 2000, over 115,000 sites will be required to keep pace
with the growing need." As a result, companies providing cellular phone
services continually make numerous cellular siting proposals to state and
local zoning boards. 2 Typically, cellular providers select tower sites by
balancing economic feasibility with sound coverage and quality recep-
tion.13 Municipal residents regularly object to the selected sites because of
the perceived negative effects cellular towers have on their health, prop-
erty values, quality of life, and surrounding environment. 4 Local zoning
boards face the nearly impossible task of balancing the conflicting inter-
ests of cellular providers and municipal residents. The location of cellular
towers inevitably sparks heated and persistent controversy.1
5
Northwest, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 21, 1996, at B01 (quoting a cellular com-
pany representative who states that cellular antenna towers are "part of the price
of technology").
8. See Towering Controversies, supra note 5, at 38. Cellular companies have a
service area which is divided into units called "cells." See id. As the number of cel-
lular users increases, the cells must be split into smaller units, and each unit re-
quires the siting of a cellular communication facility. See id. The term "cellular
tower" refers to the structure that houses the facilities that provide cellular or per-
sonal wireless services. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 248.
9. See Shawn Steward, It's a War Out There, CELLULAR Bus., June 1995, at 78,
78.
10. See id.
11. See Towering Controversies, supra note 5, at 37. Most cellular towers cur-
rently being built range from 150 to 250 feet tall. It is possible to understand the
magnitude of the growing demand better by looking at it from another perspec-
tive: By the year 2000, there will be six cellular towers for each one presently
standing. See id.
12. See Communication Law Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm.
and Fin. of the Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 190-91 (1995) [hereinafter Hear-
ings]. Before constructing a cellular tower, a provider must first acquire a federal
license and then convince local zoning authorities to approve a siting proposal.
See id; see also Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036, 1038
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (discussing the expected flurry of tower proposals as five cellu-
lar providers planned to site cellular towers in one locality); Charlie Chapple, Ra-
dio Tower Permits Are Put on Hold - Council: Proliferation Could Ruin Countryside, NEW
ORLEANs TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 23, 1996, at Al (stating that the result of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission's issuance of several cellular licenses has been
a "recent flood of requests" for tower siting permits); Michael Levy, Communities
Struggle with the Wave of the Future, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 5, 1996, at Al (discussing
the local struggle in dealing with numerous applications for additional cellular
towers).
13. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the reasons for opposition to cellular
tower siting).
15. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 248.
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Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to meet soci-
ety's communication demands. 6 This expansive piece of legislation seeks
to benefit consumers by facilitating the development of the United States'
technological infrastructure.1 7 The Act provides local zoning boards with
guidance in solving problems that arise when considering cellular tower
siting proposals. The cellular siting provisions in the Act attempt to bal-
ance the competing interests of municipal residents and cellular provid-
ers. These siting provisions, however, do not go far enough. They will not
alleviate the conflict between municipal residents and cellular providers
over cellular tower location. Consequently, protracted litigation between
providers and municipalities over tower siting will persist because the Act
fails to provide local zoning boards with a satisfactory means of addressing
the deluge of tower proposals. 9 This Note proposes an amendment to the
Telecommunications Act that would give local zoning boards the ability to
reduce conflict resulting from a cellular tower's siting.0
Part II of this Note examines the competing interests of providers
and municipal residents in determining the proper location for a cellular
tower. Part III provides a procedural summary of the traditional zoning
issues encountered in a cellular siting proposal. Part IV offers a historical
framework to the cellular siting controversy by examining case law and
discussing the inconsistent zoning standards courts employ. Part V sum-
marizes and explains the cellular siting provisions of the Act. This Part
also explains Congress' motivation for enacting each provision.
16. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-614
(West Supp. 1996).
17. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 190. Jack Fields, the chairman of the Sub-
committee on Telecommunications and Finance, discussed how the proposed Act
intended to "unleash the investment of capital" to construct the technological in-
frastructure necessary to meet society's communications needs. See id.
18. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (A) (B) (i)-
(v) (West Supp. 1996); see also Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 248 (asserting that the
development of cellular communication, a relatively new technology, has out-
paced the ability of local governments to enact zoning ordinances to accommo-
date cellular towers).
19. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 263-64. Local zoning authorities face a
challenging task in trying to balance municipal land use issues with the cellular
needs of society. When local zoning authorities "fail to meet that challenge, how-
ever, developers of cellular communication systems inevitably will call upon the
courts." Id. at 264.
20. See infra Part VII (discussing the benefits of collocation). See generally
NYAL D. DEEMS & N. STEVENSONJENNETTE III, A PRAcrIcAL GUIDE TO WINNING LAND
USE APPROVALS AND PERMITS § 1.04, at 1-37 to -38 (1996). A current trend shows
that many communities have responded to developments like cellular siting by
trying to exclude them. This results in litigation over exclusionary zoning. In the
wake of such litigation, attempts have been made to restore the balance between
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Part VI of this Note critically analyzes the Act's cellular siting provi-
sions and considers how they affect the current dilemmas posed by tower
siting. In particular, Part VI argues that the Act placed the burden of cel-
lular siting on local governments while failing to equip them adequately to
manage the development of the cellular infrastructure. In Part VII, this
Note advocates the enactment of a collocation amendment to the Tele-
communications Act. Collocation would reduce the need for cellular
tower sites by requiring competing cellular providers to share the same
tower when technologically feasible." The number of confrontations be-
tween residents opposing cellular tower sitings in their neighborhoods
and cellular phone providers would diminish. Fewer towers would be con-
structed, yet cellular service would not suffer because collocation simply
would require cellular providers better to maximize the use of already ex-
isting tower space. Consequently, a collocation amendment would pro-
mote municipal residents' interests in slowing the growth of cellular tower
sitings while satisfying cellular providers' need to expand cellular cover-
age.
II. THE OPPONENTS: THE CELLULAR PROVIDERS VS. THE NIMBYS
A. The Cellular Providers
Cellular providersn rely on two factors when deciding where to locate
cellular towers. First, cellular providers determine site location based
upon economic considerations.2' Erecting a cellular tower costs a tremen-
dous amount of money. Consumer demand for immediate and ubiqui-
tous cellular coverage increases the expense and therefore only exacer-
bates the business challenge and financial risks involved in tower
construction.24 Consequently, cellular providers have a strong financial
interest in constructing cellular towers where cellular coverage can be
maximized.25 This financial challenge can become overwhelming when
local zoning boards repeatedly deny site proposals. Ultimately, local regu-
lations frustrate cellular providers' ability to develop cellular infrastructure
and adequately satisfy society's need for cellular services.
Second, cellular providers base site proposals on tower designs that
21. See David L. Snyder, A Means to an End, TELEPHONY, Mar. 25, 1996, at 70.
22. In this Note, the term "cellular provider" is used interchangeably with
cell providers, providers, service providers, and carriers. See id.
23. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 249.
24. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 191. The already "daunting" challenges
posed by cellular siting "could become overwhelming if the industry becomes
snared in a tangle of local regulations that impede entry, development and de-
ployment of wireless services." Id.
25. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 249.
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are constructed to achieve quality reception.26 The strategic placement of
cellular towers creates a network of cellular systems that transmit the sig-
nals for cellular phone reception. 7 Because competition among cellular
providers hinges upon "quality, price, and coverage area," creating an ef-
fective cellular system becomes crucial for each provider.' As a result, cel-
lular providers propose tower sites that will enable them to compete in the
cellular market.
A cellular system in its early stages can use taller and more powerful
towers.29 The use of such towers grants cellular providers some flexibility
in determining a location acceptable to local zoning boards. In contrast,
matured cellular systems, which typically exist in condensed urban loca-
tions, require the use of shorter and less powerful towers. 3° This require-
ment limits the placement of a cellular tower to the area within a four-
block radius of the tower's ideal location. Cellular tower siting therefore
becomes critical in dense urban areas. Not surprisingly, metropolitan ar-
eas also require the greatest cellular development due to the increasing
population of cellular users.2  Consequently, cellular providers turn to
residential landowners willing to sell or lease space for the construction of
cellular facilities. 3
B. The NIMBYs
Cellular providers apply to state or local authorities for zoning per-
mits once a landowner offers to sell or lease space for a cellular facility.
Residents living near the site often fight the cellular provider's proposal.
4
These vocal opponents have been appropriately dubbed "NIMBYs," per-
sons who possess a "Not In My Back Yard" mentality. 5
26. See id. at 249-50. Systematic designs often take the form of a hexagonal
configuration, which requires that antenna sites be located no more than one-
fourth of a cell radius from the ideal location of the center cell. Id.
27. See id.
28. Susan Lorde Martin, Communities and Telecommunications Corporations:
Rethinking the Rules for Zoning Variances, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 235, 245 (1995). Cellular
providers seek to increase the number of cell sites in particular areas to improve
quality and coverage. By doing so, cellular providers can challenge their competi-
tion for control of the cellular market. See id.
29. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 250.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 191. Transmitters must be located in areas
of exchange - where people live, work, and travel - or the system will not work.
See id.
33. See Martin, supra note 28, at 250 (discussing the conflict of interest cre-
ated by the financial interest of nearby landowners).
34. See Steward, supra note 9, at 78 (describing the war waged by citizens and
municipal zoning boards against cellular providers seeking to build towers).
35. See id. A group of residents in Connecticut who do not want cell towers
1006 [Vol. 23
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The NIMBY theory encompasses a number of concerns and princi-
ples. One concern revolves around maintaining property values near
proposed tower sitings.36 Residents often argue that cellular towers de-
stroy the aesthetics of the neighborhood, 7 resulting in falling property
values."' A second concern of NIMBYs focuses upon preserving the health
of citizens who live near the proposed cellular tower. Some citizens allege
that the electromagnetic fields emitted by cellular towers pose health risks
to those living nearby.5 9 A third concern focuses on environmental pres-
ervation and maintaining "a less-commercial quality of life." 40 The con-
struction of a cellular tower requires the destruction of surrounding prop-
erty, which scars the landscape and industrializes the area. A fourth
NIMBY principle centers on battling big business, which NIMBYs see as
being driven by nothing more than sheer greed . Municipal residents of-
ten believe the selected tower locations meet the needs of cellular provid-
ers, but fail to accommodate the community's best interests.4 Coupling
cellular providers' and NIMBYs' conflicting interests with the growing
demand for cellular service, it is no surprise that these opponents are per-
petually waging bitter and protracted battles.
to be constructed near their homes call themselves NOT, "Neighbors Opposed to
the Tower." See Neighbors Opposed to the Tower v. Connection Siting Council,
No. CV 9605576025, 1996 WL 409320, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 1996); see
also Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 664 A.2d 1284, 1286-89 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (exemplifying the typical NIMBY argument that cellular
expansion should be excluded from a particular community).
36. See Steward, supra note 9, at 78 (discussing the view that maintaining
property values outweighs the benefits that cellular access confers to the commu-
nity).
37. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAw 459-61 (3d ed. 1993). A major-
ity of courts hold that aesthetics alone constitute a legitimate governmental pur-
pose for regulating land use. See id. The United States Supreme Court has
adopted the "aesthetics alone" standard, stating that "[i]t is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
38. See Steward, supra note 9, at 78.
39. See Martin, supra note 28, at 241-44. Martin argues that even if fears
about electromagnetic field ("EMF") radiation are unsubstantiated, the fear itself
reduces the value of homes located near cellular towers. See id. (noting that Con-
gress authorized a $65,000,000 research program to determine whether EMF is
harmful to human health and that a final report will be received by the President
on September 30, 1997). But cf. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. §
332(c) (7) (B) (iv) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that cellular towers meeting Federal
Communication Commission safety and health guidelines cannot be challenged
on the grounds that the tower siting will adversely affect local residents' health).
40. Martin, supra note 28, at 235.
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III. THE BATTLEFIELD: FROM THE LOCAL ZONING
COMMISSION TO STATE COURTS
As demand for cellular service escalates, cellular providers search for
additional tower locations. Yet, most zoning ordinances do not specify
where cellular towers may be located. Moreover, the recent development
of cellular technology has simply outpaced the ability of local zoning
boards to establish ordinances applicable to cellular siting.43 As a result,
zoning boards must review their respective laws, balance the interests of
their communities, and attempt to locate cellular towers at sites mutually
beneficial to the provider and the municipality." The political power of
local residents often influences this difficult balancing act, resulting in the
rejection of tower proposals. Thus begins the battle between the cellular
provider and the municipality.
A cellular provider has two options if its proposed site does not con-
form to the zoning ordinance, if such an ordinance exists. First, the pro-
45vider may apply for a special exception. A special exception grants a
provider a conditional or special use permit in a certain area if the terms
of the ordinance are met.46 In many cases, however, zoning ordinances do
not allow exceptions for cellular siting.47
Second, when a zoning ordinance does not provide for an exception,
48a cellular provider may instead apply for a variance. Most courts require
that applicants for a variance have a legal interest in the property." In re-
cent years, however, some courts have allowed parties without a legal in-
terest, but who are aggrieved or interested parties, to seek variances.0 A
cellular provider initially must demonstrate that it falls within one of these
categories if it hopes to erect a tower.
In contrast to an exception, which courts grant when the applicant
43. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 248.
44. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 191. Cellular providers charge that the
local zoning board balance tilts in favor of communities, because zoning boards
"try to force all wireless providers to place all facilities in a few designated loca-
tions within the community." Id. They assert that transmitters must be located in
areas of traffic in order for the system to work. See id. Conflict arises when the
community's property allocations do not satisfy the providers' needs.
45. See DONALD G. HAGMAN &JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 6.3, at 166-68 (2d ed. 1986).
46. See id.
47. See Littlejohn, supra note 3, at 248 (attributing the lack of local zoning
regulations addressing cellular siting to cellular technology's rapid growth). But
cf. Evans v. Shore Communications, 685 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(considering a zoning ordinance including cellular siting as a possible special ex-
ception in a particular area).
48. See HAGMAN &JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 45, § 6.3, at 167.
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satisfies certain conditions, zoning boards issue variances when the appli-
cant suffers a hardship that is "beyond the 'spirit of the ordinance"' and
that causes "substantial injustice" to the applicant.5 The cellular provider
typically carries the burden of proving the existence and extent of the
52 53hardship. Providers may seek either an area variance or a use variance.
As can be expected, inconsistent applications of variance law abound due
to the ambiguous and subjective nature of interpreting the hardship stan-
dard.54
In addition to wielding the power to deny variances and exceptions, a
zoning board maintains another defense against cellular providers seeking
tower sites. When faced with difficult decisions, a zoning board may issue
a moratorium on siting proposals. A moratorium grants the board an ex-
tended period of time to analyze the proposal more carefully before de-
ciding to grant or deny it.55 Cellular providers generally challenge mora-
toria because a delayed zoning decision inhibits a provider's business,
56resulting in lost income. If the zoning board denies the variance after
the moratorium period expires, the cellular provider may contest the de-
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d 105, 108 (N.Y.
1978).
53. See id. An area variance does not involve a use which the zoning ordi-
nance prohibits, whereas a use variance permits land to be used in a manner that
is ordinarily proscribed. See id.; 3 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAw OF ZONING
§§ 18.06-.07 (2d ed. 1977). A zoning board will grant an area variance if the ap-
plicant shows that strict compliance with the zoning law will cause "practical diffi-
culties." See Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d at 108; Wilcox v. Zoning Bd., 217 N.E.2d 633,
635 (N.Y. 1966); Village of Bronxville v. Francis, 135 N.E.2d 724, 725 (N.Y. 1956).
By contrast, a zoning board will grant a use variance if the applicant can meet the
heavier burden of showing unnecessary hardship. See Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d at 108.
A use variance results in a greater deviation from the ordinance and likely will
have a more adverse impact on the community; hence, there is a greater burden
of proof on the applicant. See id.; National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 361 N.E.2d 1028,
1031 (N.Y. 1977).
54. See HAGMAN &JJUERGENSMEYER, supra note 45, § 6.3, at 168. A number of
reasons have been offered to explain the vast body of law variance and exception
provisions generate. First, a grant or denial of an exception or variance often has
drastic economic repercussions. Second, a multitude of administrative bodies ap-
ply substantially different rules when making zoning decisions. Third, the persons
who sit on zoning boards may possess great political, economic, and practical
sense, but lack technical expertise. Fourth, courts often invite a "judicial rehash
of the issues involved" because they balk at deferring to the judgments of seem-
ingly inadequate zoning boards. Id.
55. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036,
1039-40 (W.D. Wash. 1996). In Sprint Spectrum, the court regarded the morato-
rium as a short-term suspension of permit-issuing while the community gathered
additional information. Id. at 1040. The court also held that a local govemment
cannot be forced to make a decision on a rigid timetable in order to meet the
economic needs of the cellular provider. Id.
56. See id. at 1038.
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cision before the zoning board of appeals, if one exists. As a final resort,
the provider can seek judicial review.-*
The procedures local zoning boards use when considering site pro-
posals fail to address the conflicts that arise between municipal zoning
boards and cellular providers operating on a national level. Standards for
accepting and denying variances differ with each zoning board. Such in-
consistencies compel cellular providers to challenge zoning decisions.
6
0
State courts ultimately are forced to interpret various zoning ordinances
when considering whether to affirm a board decision. Unfortunately,
state courts, confronted with numerous ordinances, rulings, and policies,
have not clarified the standards for granting or denying variances for cel-
lular providers. Consequently, a number of standards have developed.
IV. THE WAR UP UNTIL THIS POINT: A BRIEF HISTORY LESSON
Cellular providers must apply to local zoning boards for either special
exceptions or variances in order to construct cellular towers. 6' Because of
the subjective standards for variances and exceptions, local zoning
authorities possess vast discretion to determine the fate of a cellular tower
proposal. To meet zoning requirements and to avoid litigation, cellular
providers argue that they provide an essential service to the community
and, as a result, they should be deemed a public utility.6 2 This classifica-
tion benefits cellular providers because courts give much deference to
public utilities in zoning matters.63 The public utility standard requires a
57. See Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d at 108. The New York Court of Appeals asserted
that a zoning board of appeals does have the power to issue a variance. See id.
58. See HAGMAN &JJUERGENSMEYER, supra note 45, § 6.3, at 168.
59. See id.
60. See id. Before going to court, however, plaintiffs first must exhaust their
administrative remedies. See id.
61. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing special excep-
tions and variances).
62. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Rosenberg, 624 N.E.2d 990, 993 (N.Y. 1993).
Courts traditionally have held that a zoning board may not exclude a public utility
from a community where the public utility has demonstrated a need for its facili-
ties. See, e.g., Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d at 111; Long Island Water Corp. v. Michaelis,
282 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Griffin, 74
N.Y.S.2d 348, 349-51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947). However, courts have stressed that
this does not mean that a utility may place its facility wherever it chooses. See, e.g.,
Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d at 111; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. City of Fulton, 188
N.Y.S.2d 717, 721-23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Incorpo-
rated Village of East Rockaway, 110 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952).
63. As part of a variance application, zoning boards have required appli-
cants to show unnecessary hardship in conforming with the zoning ordinance. See
Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 852-53 (N.Y. 1939). To establish unnecessary
hardship, courts traditionally have required the applicant to show: 1) that the
land cannot yield a reasonable return if it is used only for the purpose allowed by
the ordinance; 2) that the circumstances that cause the hardship are unique to
1010 [Vol. 23
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cellular provider to demonstrate that its cellular tower would have only a
"minimal" burden on the community." Thus, the cellular provider need
not meet the "unnecessary hardship" standard applicable to non-utilityS • 65
variance applications. State courts, however, have not uniformly ac-
cepted this argument, resulting in inconsistency among differing jurisdic-
tions.66 The following two subsections provide case studies of the two posi-
tions state courts typically take and illustrate the reasoning commonly
applied.
A. Cellular Telephone Co. v. Rosenberg: Accepting the Public
Utility Argument
In Cellular Telephone Co. v. Rosenberg, the cellular provider, Cellular
One, informed the local planning board of Dobbs Ferry, New York, that it
wanted to construct a cellular antenna on an existing water tower. The
water tower was on the grounds of a nonprofit corporation licensed to
treat and house neglected children.& Cellular One asserted that building
the land and not the general neighborhood; and 3) that the requested use will
not change the character of the community. See id. at 853. However, when courts
regard an entity as a public utility, a different standard applies. See Hoffman, 374
N.E.2d at 109. When a public utility applies for a variance, the unique circum-
stances surrounding the land may result simply from the particular needs of the
utility, which inevitably create an impact on the neighborhood. Courts thus have
elected to analyze the public necessity for the proposed use when determining
whether to grant or deny the variance. See id. (stating that a court must consider
the effect the denial of the variance will have on the utility's customers); Long Is-
land Lighting Co. v. Griffin, 74 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349-50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947).
64. See, e.g., Rosenberg, 624 N.E.2d at 994.
65. See, e.g., id.
66. See, e.g., Crown Communications v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 679 A.2d 271,
274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (denying public utility status to appellant because it
was "a purely private unregulated enterprise not legally bound to serve the public
at reasonable rates"); Bell Ad. Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Borough of Baldwin, 677 A.2d
363, 367 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (holding that even if appellant was a public util-
ity, the benefit of its tower would extend beyond the district in which it was to be
located and, therefore, the requested variance was denied); Bell Ad. Mobile Sys. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 676 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (stating that a
cellular provider is not a public utility for zoning purposes). But see, e.g., Nynex
Mobile Communication Co. v. Hazlet Township, 648 A.2d 724, 732 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994); River Bend Farm Dev. Co. v. Cellular One, No. 95-P-0076,
1996 WL 210783, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1996) (denying variance request
because the local zoning ordinance did not except the construction of a cellular
tower); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Council of Hampton, 686 A.2d 905, 907-08
(Pa. 1996) (stating that a cellular provider is a public utility for zoning purposes);
Hawk v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 618 A.2d 1087, 1090 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (stating
that special exceptions are considered in light of local zoning ordinances and
their express definitions).
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a tower would allow it to provide greater reception and service to cellular
users within the area.69 At the time, many gaps existed in the cellular pro-
vider's system, due to the large intervals between existing antennas.7 0 As a
result, the quality of the connection and the reception suffered.7'
The proposed site was zoned as an educational district which did not
72permit cellular siting as a use . Therefore, Cellular One applied for a
permit to begin installation.73 The planning board denied Cellular One's
permit application because the chosen site was not zoned for cellular serv-
74 75ices. Shortly after the denial, Cellular One applied for a use variance.
Cellular One explained that it selected the proposed site because of its
natural elevation, the existing water tower, 6 its location away from the city,
and its proximity to highways.77 In addition, Cellular One argued that it
was a public utility and was therefore entitled to a lower standard of review
for the variance. 8 The zoning board disagreed and denied the use vari-
ance, citing as controlling factors health concerns for nearby citizens and
the lack of public utility status. 79
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Cellular
One was, in fact, a public utility for zoning purposes. 80 According to both
courts, Cellular One sufficiently possessed the characteristics outlined un-
der the general definition of a public utility."' The appellate court held
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Many of the calls in Cellular One's service area reportedly were in-
terrupted or disconnected due to the lack of antennas. Interference, static, and
cross-talk also were reported, rendering many calls inaudible. See id.
72. Id. at 992.
73. Rosenberg, 624 N.E.2d at 992.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. By using an existing water structure, Cellular One would not need to
construct another tower for the antenna, which it contended would be spatially
beneficial for the community. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Rosenberg, 624 N.E.2d at 992. In denying the variance, the board as-
serted that Cellular One failed to prove that: (1) the land would not yield a rea-
sonable return if used solely for the purpose allowed by the zoning statute; (2) the
circumstances of Cellular One were unique and not related to the general condi-
tion of the neighborhood; (3) a public necessity existed for its service or that it
was a public utility for zoning purposes; (4) health hazards did not exist; and (5)
there were no alternate sites that would accommodate Cellular One's business.
Id.
80. Id. at 993; see also 2 ANDERSON, supra note 53, § 12.32, at 568-69. A "pub-
lic utility" has been defined as "[a] private business, often a monopoly, which pro-
vides services so essential to the public interest as to enjoy certain privileges such
as eminent domain and be subject to such governmental regulation as fixing of
rates, and standards of service." Id.
81. Rosenberg, 624 N.E.2d at 993. Characteristics of a public utility generally
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that if the service is deemed "necessary" for the community, and if the
burden on the community is minimal, then the variance should be
granted. 82 The appeals court concluded that Cellular One's proposal met
both conditions.8' Thus, Cellular One successfully met the zoning criteria
applied by local authorities because it qualified as a public utility. 8
B. Akron Cellular Telephone Co. v. City of Hudson Village:
Rejecting the Public Utility Argument
In Hudson, Ohio, Cellular One, through Akron Cellular Telephone
Company, proposed to construct a cellular tower on a site that did not
meet the city's zoning ordinance." Rather than apply for a special excep-
tion or a variance, Cellular One sought an exemption from the zoning re-
quirements by asserting that it was a public utility that provided an essen-
tial service to the community.86 The zoning inspector denied Cellular
One's application for an exemption, reasoning that the provider did not
17qualify for public utility status and did not provide an essential service.
The board of zoning and building appeals upheld the zoning inspector's
include:
(1) the essential nature of the services offered which must be taken into
account when regulations seek to limit expansion of facilities which pro-
vide the services, (2) "operat[ion] under a franchise, subject to some
measure of public regulation," and (3) logistic problems, such as the fact
that "[tihe product of the utility must be piped, wired, or otherwise
served to each user[,] the supply must be maintained at a constant level
to meet minute-by-minute need [,] [tihe user has no alternative source
[and] the supplier commonly has no alternative means of delivery.
Id.
82. Id. at 994 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d 105,
111 (N.Y. 1978)).
83. Id.
84. Id.; cf. Crown Communications v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 679 A.2d 271
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). In Crown, the applicant's public utility argument failed.
The zoning board successfully argued that the applicant was not a public service
corporation because the public utility commission maintained no authority to
regulate it. Id. at 273. It is important to note the distinction between the stan-
dard used in Rosenberg and that used in Crown. Rosenberg does not mention or al-
lude to the requirement of public utility commission regulation. In Crown, how-
ever, this requirement was pivotal to the decision. Id. But see Hawk v. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 618 A.2d 1087, 1090 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (stating that an entity
can be regarded as a public utility without being subject to jurisdiction of a public
utility commission).
85. Akron Cellular Tel. Co. v. City of Hudson Village, No. 17681, 1996 WL
577661, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1996). The zoning ordinance had desig-
nated the area proposed for the new cell site as a residential area. Id. Hence, the
construction of the cell tower did not conform to the designated use set forth in
the zoning ordinance. Id.
86. Id. at *2.
87. Id. at* 1.
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decision, as did the trial court upon appeal."
The Ohio Court of Appeals agreed that Cellular One failed to pro-
vide an essential service and thus did not qualify as a public utility. 9 The
majority opinion specifically noted that Cellular One did not meet the es-
sential service standard9o and did not possess eminent domain powers,"'
two conditions necessary to qualify as a public utility under the applicable
zoning ordinance.2 Even if Cellular One had successfully argued that it
provided essential services, the lack of eminent domain powers prevented
it from attaining public utility status.93 Thus, Cellular One was denied a
zoning exemption because it failed to qualify as a public utility.
94
88. Id.
89. Id. at *2. Like the trial court, the Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that
the cellular provider did not satisfy the requisite elements to acquire public utility
status. In addition, the court of appeals rejected the cellular provider's conten-
tion that a state statute defined cellular telecommunications providers as public
utilities with respect to municipal zoning regulations. Id.
90. Id. The court examined the relevant zoning code provision that pro-
vides a nonexclusive list of activities qualifying as essential services and that thus
are exempt from zoning restrictions. Id. at *3. The list provided:
Essential services . . . would include services such as the erection, con-
struction, alteration, or maintenance by public utilities or municipal or
other governmental agencies, of underground and overhead gas, electri-
cal, steam or water transmission or distribution systems, collection,
communication, supply or disposal systems, including poles, wires,
mains, drains, sewers, pipes, conduits, cables, fire alarm boxes, police
call boxes, traffic signals, hydrants, and other similar equipment and ac-
cessories in connection therewith; reasonably necessary for the furnish-
ing of adequate service by such public utilities or municipal or other
governmental agencies or for the public health or safety or general wel-
fare, but not including buildings.
Id.
91. Akron Cellular, 1996 WL 577661, at *2. The trial court discerned, and
the appellate court corroborated, that the essential services list was limited to the
type of public utilities that have the power of eminent domain. The record failed
to disclose any evidence that the cellular provider held the power of eminent do-
main. Id. at *4. In addition, the cell provider failed to allege that it did have such
powers. Id.
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id. at *4.
94. The concurring opinion agreed that Cellular One was not exempt from
the zoning ordinance because it did not possess the requisite eminent domain
powers. See id. (Reece, J., concurring). However, the concurring opinion also
stated that cellular providers may qualify as public utilities in cases where signifi-
cant use and public need for expanded cellular services so dictate. The concur-
ring opinion credited this possibility to the "advent of deregulation," which has
opened the door to regarding cellular providers as public utilities. The concur-
rence concluded by warning that the court must balance the conflicting needs
and rights associated with cellular siting:
The legislators, both state and local, must be mindful of the created
need for services and the infringement upon individuals' property rights
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C. A Comparison of the Case Studies: Acceptance Versus Rejection of the
Public Utility Argument
Rosenberg and Akron Cellular highlight the inconsistencies among vari-
ous jurisdictions' zoning decisions. In both cases, Cellular One aimed to
expand its cellular services by proposing additional cellular sites. Each
court, however, subjected the proposals to different zoning standards. In
Rosenberg, the New York Court of Appeals deemed Cellular One a public
utility because its services were necessary and the burden the proposed
siting posed to the community was minimal.95 By contrast, the Ohio Court
of Appeals in Akron Cellular refused to identify Cellular One as a public
utility because it did not provide an "essential service" and lacked eminent
domain powers.
Such disparate standards place cellular providers in a difficult posi-
tion. Cellular providers perform business operations on a national level
by providing coverage to many, if not all, states. State and local zoning
decisions, however, vary from state to state. A cellular provider like Cellu-
lar One may be regarded as a public utility in one jurisdiction and as a pri-
vate enterprise somewhere else. This creates confusion and frustration for
cellular providers attempting to meet society's cellular needs. Ultimately,
these conflicting standards interrupt the development of a cellular pro-
vider's system and create significant economic challenges to the pro-
vider.96 In addition, the uncertainty prevents any calculated preparation
to develop the cellular infrastructure. As the cases above demonstrate,
cellular providers, uncertain and frustrated over jurisdictional inconsis-
tency, commonly appeal zoning decisions. The resulting litigation and
subsequent appeals only discourage cooperative efforts among cellular
providers, zoning boards, and municipal residents.
to provide those services. We want and need new and expanded serv-
ices. We don't want the mechanical apparatus, towers, in our back yards.
The legislators must balance these conflicting needs and rights.
Id. at *5. Unfortunately, the concurring opinion failed to provide any guidance as
to how to strike such a balance. See id.
95. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Rosenberg, 634 N.E.2d 990, 993 (N.Y. 1993).
96. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 191 (asserting that "undue costs" imposed
by local zoning boards through restrictive zoning policies "shortchange their con-
stituents who would be better served by regulators that encourage networks to
flourish"); Phillip Rosario & Mark F. Kohler, Commentary, The Telecommunications
Act of 1996: A State Perspective, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 331, 349 (1996) (stating that the
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V. THE PROPOSED TRUCE: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1996
In 1996, Congress amended the Telecommunications Act to govern,
monitor, and facilitate the technological development of telecommunica-
tions.97 Specifically, Congress responded to the evolution of modern
communications by attempting to resolve the cellular siting conflicts that
have surfaced. It amended the Act by preempting local governments' cel-
lular siting authority to some extent.f By doing so, Congress altered an
area of regulation traditionally occupied by state and local governments. 99
The Act limits local and state zoning authorities' control over cellular
tower siting.1°° Simultaneously, it preserves the traditional authority of a
state or local government "over decisions regarding the placement, con-
struction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities."10' The
Act is not intended to abrogate local zoning authority over cellular siting;
rather, it attempts to limit local authority in order to accomplish the na-
tional policies and standards of developing a competitive cellular infra-
structure. The Act professes to balance local zoning authority and the
needs of its residents with federal policy and the needs of cellular provid-
ers. The significant provisions directed at local zoning requirements are
discussed below.
97. This Note limits its analysis to the newly-enacted provision dealing with
cellular antenna location. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)( 7 ) (West Supp. 1996). The
1996 amendments address numerous telecommunication concerns and conse-
quently raise issues beyond the scope of this Note. See generally id. §§ 151-614.
98. Seeid. § 332(c)(7)(A).
99. See Rosario & Kohler, supra note 96, at 347.
100. The portion of the Act limiting local zoning boards' control over cellu-
lar tower sitings contains five provisions. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i)-(v).
The third provision requires local authorities to provide substantial evidence and
written findings to support any decision to deny a cellular provider's request for a
tower location. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Because courts applied this standard
when reviewing zoning boards' decisions prior to the Act, this provision does not
alter the duty imposed upon zoning boards when they issue findings on the
placement of cellular towers. See, e.g., Clark v. Waupaca County Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 519 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (applying the substantial evi-
dence test to determine the appropriateness of findings on tower siting); see also
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-09 (1996) (identifying the substantial evi-
dence test as the standard for review of agency actions), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 121, 223. Consequently, this provision is not discussed in this Note.
101. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (A) (West Supp. 1996).
102. See Rosario & Kohler, supra note 96, at 349.
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A. Prohibiting Unreasonable Discrimination Among Cellular Providers
The first provision prohibits local authorities from unreasonably dis-
criminating among competing cellular providers during the zoning proc-
ess. 103 The provision ensures that a state or local government will not un-
reasonably favor one competitor over another when making its siting
decisions.10 4  Similarly, the provision prohibits local zoning authorities
from enforcing zoning laws that effectively banish cellular providers from105
an area. In other words, a municipality cannot enact zoning laws to pre-
vent cellular towers from sprouting within its community.106 This provision
has the most marked effect upon municipalities and their zoning laws.
The municipality must deal with cellular providers, must accept cellular
towers within its community, and must provide all cellular providers an
equal opportunity to propose and possibly acquire tower sites.17
A number of policy reasons support this provision. The congres-
sional mandate prohibiting discrimination requires local authorities to
consider the impact of their zoning decisions on the communications
marketplace. 00 In addition, much of the Act, and particularly this provi-
sion, expresses the need to stimulate competition.'0 When signing the
Act, President Clinton emphasized the imperative to lessen government
restrictions on telecommunication providers in order to promote competi-
tion and private investment."o It is hoped that competition and invest-
103. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i). The Telecommunications Act now pro-
vides that "[t]he regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or instrumen-
tality thereof - (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of func-
tionally equivalent services; and (II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of pro-
hibiting the provisions of personal wireless services." Id.
104. See H.R. CONr. REP. No. 104458, at 208 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 121, 222. The phrase "unreasonably discriminate among providers
of functionally equivalent services" is intended to equip local authorities with the
flexibility to treat differently those facilities that create different aesthetic, visual,
or safety concerns. Id. at 208, 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 222.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Westel-Milwaukee Co. v. Walworth County, 556 N.W.2d 107, 109
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996). The Act does not strip a municipality of its zoning power.
Rather, it intends to strike a balance between local zoning power and free compe-
tition by prohibiting local discrimination only if it is unreasonable. Id. (citing 47
U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (I)).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Statement by the President, The White House: Office of the Press Secre-
tary (Feb. 12, 1996). After signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Presi-
dent Clinton stated:
This landmark legislation fulfills my Administration's promise to reform
our telecommunications laws in a manner that leads to competition and
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ment will open new markets and create new opportunities."' By prohibit-
ing siting discrimination, the Act attempts to facilitate competition be-
cause it ensures that the marketplace, rather than zoning boards, deter-
mines which cellular provider will serve the area.
11
2
B. Requiring Zoning Decisions to Be Made in a Reasonable Period of
Time
The second key provision in the Act seeks to provide a smooth and
unburdened hearing process for cellular providers.11 3 The provision es-
sentially prevents a state or local authority from delaying the hearing pro-
cess by requiring those authorities to make cellular zoning decisions
within a reasonable period of time.14 This provision does not prevent lo-
cal authorities from issuing moratoria, however.1 The provision also does
not require local zoning authorities to provide preferential treatment to
cellular providers; it only mandates that local authorities consider cellular
site proposals within a period that is reasonable for zoning-related deci-• • 116
sion-making. In particular, local authorities must render cellular siting
decisions that involve a zoning variance or a public hearing within the
"usual period under such circumstances.""'
private investment, promotes universal service and open access to infor-
mation networks, and provides for flexible government regulation....
In the world of the mass media, this Act seeks to remove unnecessary
regulation and open the way for freer markets.
Id.
111. See id.
112. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-08 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 121, 222.
113. 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (ii) (West Supp. 1996).
114. Id. This provision states:
A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on any
request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless
service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the request is
duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into account
the nature and scope of such request.
Id.; see also Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (W.D.
Wash. 1996) (ruling that the city of Medina's enforcement of a six-month morato-
rium to analyze site proposals did not violate this provision).
115. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, 924 F. Supp. at 1040 (upholding a city's deci-
sion to impose a moratorium on site proposals to allow the city to study, deliber-
ate, and gather more information before making a decision to deny or accept a
proposed cell site).
116. See Westel-Milwaukee Co. v. Walworth County, 556 N.W.2d 107, 109
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Sprint Spectrum, 924 F. Supp. at 1040).
117. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-09 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 121, 221-23. The Act was not meant to provide preferential treat-
ment to cellular providers by altering the generally applicable timetables for zon-
ing decisions. See id. at 209, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 223.
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This provision comports with Congress' underlying policy of further
developing the cellular infrastructure. Consumer demand for immedi-
ate and ubiquitous cellular service has presented a significant business
challenge to cellular providers."9 This provision allows providers to main-
tain the pace of expansion by affording them protection from delayed
zoning decisions. 20  Ultimately, such protection prevents local govern-
ments from frustrating the development of a cellular infrastructure and
impeding consumers' access to cellular services.
C. Limiting the Scope of Environmental and Health Objections to
Tower Siting
Another important provision in the Act forbids local authorities from
considering any possible environmental or health consequences that may
result from cellular tower emissions.1 ' As noted previously, environmental
and health effects from cellular emissions have been a primary source of
local opposition to tower siting.2 2 Some providers contend that local
emission regulations have been so stringent and unreasonable as effec-
tively to prohibit cellular tower siting in many areas. 2 This provision re-
sponds by precluding local authorities from regulating emissions while es-
tablishing a national emissions standard.
By prohibiting local zoning boards from denying site proposals for
environmental reasons, Congress confiscated a powerful weapon from the
residential and municipal arsenal. Municipalities no longer have
118. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 191 (explaining that this legislation in-
tends to increase competition and facilitate the development of the cellular infra-
structure).
119. See id.
120. See Westel-Milwaukee, 556 N.W.2d at 109. The court stated that Congress
has "tried to stop local authorities from keeping wireless providers tied up in the
hearing process" with this provision. Id.
121. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iv) (West Supp. 1996). The fourth
clause provides that "[n]o state or local government or instrumentality thereof
may regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emis-
sions to the extent such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations con-
cerning such emissions." Id.
122. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
123. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 191 (stating that local authorities develop
cellular emissions regulations as a political response to the "unfounded claims of
a few vocal constituents who wrongly assert that the emissions generated by cell
sites pose a health risk"); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
124. See Martin, supra note 28, at 236. Professor Martin depicts the tactics
that residents and zoning boards use against cellular providers wishing to erect
cellular towers within that community. One primary weapon criticized by Martin
is the argument that the health and safety of citizens must be preserved against
possible EMF radiation from cellular towers. Id.
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authority to make emissions considerations; rather, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) will supply guidelines as to what constitutes
acceptable emissions levels. 2 - Many environmentalists and residents have
opposed, and will continue to oppose, this provision since they doubt FCC
studies which conclude that cellular towers do not pose significant envi-
ronmental and health risks.1 26 Until evidence conclusively shows that cel-
lular tower emissions pose no health threat, this provision undoubtedly
will generate a great deal of litigation.
1 27
D. Providing ExpeditedJudicial Review of Zoning Decisions
The final substantive provision of the Act affecting tower siting per-
mits cellular providers to seek expedited judicial relief against a local• 128
authority. A provider can appeal a zoning decision to a state court or to
the federal district court in which the proposed site is located. 129 A party
125. See47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iv).
126. See Martin, supra note 28, at 242. Martin asserts that studies on the ef-
fects of EMF on human health and the environment are not complete and there-
fore are unsubstantiated. Id. In 1992, the congressional research campaign for
EMF study performed research and submitted a preliminary progress report on
December 31, 1995. See id. A completed study and a final report will not be avail-
able until September 30, 1997. See id.; cf Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts:
Is There a Rational Solution to the Problem of Causation, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 190
(1992). Poulter notes that the connection between cellular antennas and cancer
is not completely substantiated. The primary evidence of causation that residents
provide is that several persons who live near cellular antennas have been diag-
nosed with cancer. According to Poulter, such evidence is not statistically signifi-
cant. Id.
127. See generally Cindy Sage & Joseph G. Johns, Electromagnetic Radiation: A
Case for Relevance in Real Estate Transactions and Eminent Domain, 20 REAL EST. L.J.
193, 193 (1991). Sage and Johns argue that despite recent scientific studies, EMF
remains an elusive factor in determining adverse health consequences. Id. Ac-
cording to the authors, such studies have failed to produce reliable results. Id. In
addition, the public still fears that EMF can stimulate adverse health conse-
quences. Id. Therefore, the authors assert that the lack of concrete scientific evi-
dence regarding the health effects of EMF, coupled with public perception, indi-
cate that the controversy over EMF has not dissipated. Id.
128. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (v) (West Supp. 1996). This limitation
provides that
any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a
State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsis-
tent with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or fail-
ure to act, commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.
The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis. Any
person adversely affected by an act or failure to act by a State or local
government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with
clause (iv) may petition the Commission for relief.
Id.
129. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996
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may appeal if a local government's act or failure to act adversely affects
it.'3° This provision does not necessarily control the procedures of the lo-
cal zoning entity as do the other three provisions discussed here. Instead,
this provision controls the zoning process by enabling the cellular pro-
vider to seek an expedited determination of the local zoning board's ac-
tion or inaction.' This provision may encourage further litigation be-
tween cellular providers and local zoning authorities because cellular
providers may find it easier to appeal zoning decisions.
Without question, the Act's detailed guidelines represent an attempt
to quell the recurring turbulent relations between cellular providers and
local residents. The Act attempts to strike a balance between local zoning
power and development of the cellular infrastructure. However, a few
cases already illustrate the unrelenting frustration and conflict over cellu-
lar siting, despite the newly-enacted provisions.13 2 As a result, it appears
that the Act did not resolve the protracted cellular siting conflicts between
cellular providers and municipalities.
VI. IS THE TRUCE OVER? SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
In enacting legislation addressing cellular tower siting, Congress at-
tempted to bring about a truce between cellular providers and municipali-
ties by reconciling their respective interests.1 33 The Act protects municipal
residents by preserving local siting authority; yet, the Act assists providers
in developing a cellular infrastructure by promoting competition. 1 4 Many
U.S.C.C.A.N. 121, 221-23. A party can commence action after final administrative
action rather than waiting for the exhaustion of any otherwise required state court
remedy. Id.
130. See47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036,
1040 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Evans v. Shore Communications, 685 A.2d 454, 463
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). In Evans, the court ruled that the county board of ap-
peals wrongly relied on the proliferation of cellular towers as a basis for denying a
provider's request for a special exception. Id. It also held that the county board
of appeals properly denied the cellular provider's variance request to add 100 feet
to an existing tower in order to allow collocation, because the needs of the collo-
cated companies were not particular to the land but were created by the provider.
Id. at 466; see also Bell Ad. Mobile Sys. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 676 A.2d 1255, 1261
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (noting that the Act's prohibition against local zoning
board consideration of environmental and health effects of cellular emissions
would have serious repercussions in the future).
133. See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (A)-(B) (West Supp. 1996) (pre-
serving the ability of local governments to determine the proper location, con-
struction, and alterations of cellular towers, while simultaneously imposing certain
restrictions on what local governments may consider when resolving tower siting
issues).
134. See Rosario & Kohler, supra note 96, at 349. The siting provisions in the
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view the legislation as a tremendous leap forward in telecommunications
law because of the balancing act attempted by Congress."' It remains un-
certain, however, whether the Act solves all the problems associated with
cellular tower siting proposals. Instead, it appears that the Act may have
exacerbated some problems. As a result, one commentator correctly
dubbed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 the "lawyers' full employ-
ment act. " 1-6
The Act pursues the urgent need to develop the cellular infrastruc-
ture by promoting competition.17 Cellular providers have responded by
inundating local zoning boards with tower proposals.'" Only time will tell
whether the Act will engender the competition necessary to establish the
cellular infrastructure required to meet society's needs. In any event, the
Act fails to provide local zoning authorities with an adequate means of
managing the deluge of tower proposals. The burden of controlling the
growth of the cellular infrastructure ultimately falls upon the local zoning
boards. This only serves to overwhelm these agencies since they must ac-
commodate cellular systems without sacrificing local land use needs. To
make matters even worse, the Act purports to preserve local zoning
authority, yet simultaneously undermines it by placing specific restrictions
on the zoning board's authority. Unfortunately, the conflicts inherent in
cellular siting are only exacerbated by these restrictions. A critique of the
Act's limitations follows.
A. The Continuing Barrage of Proposals: Forcing the Acceptance of
Cellular Towers
The first pertinent restriction prevents a local government from pro-
hibiting cellular siting and from unreasonably discriminating among cellu-
lar providers.' 9 This provision essentially forces a zoning authority to ac-
cept cellular towers into its community and to offer equal opportunities to
the many competing providers.'o As a result, the Act encourages each
Act state that Congress intended to respect local cellular siting authority. The Act
then provides limitations on such authority to achieve the necessary balance be-
tween localities and providers. See id.
135. See Symposium, Panel III: Implications of the New Telecommunications Leg-
islation, 6 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 517, 543 (1996).
136. Id. at 520.
137. See id. at 543. The Act advances five principles. First, the Act encour-
ages private investment on the "Information Superhighway." Second, the Act
promotes and protects competition. Third, the Act opens access to the "Informa-
tion Superhighway" for both consumers and service providers. Fourth, the Act
preserves and enhances the concept of universal service. Fifth, the Act provides
flexibility to regulators when immediate changes occur in technology and in the
market. See id.
138. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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provider to propose one or more cellular sites in an attempt to develop
cellular systems that furnish reception and coverage superior to their
competitors' systems. 141
Though it enables the cellular infrastructure to grow, increased
competition comes with a price. The competition leads to a mass of siting
proposals that local zoning boards must process. Because they lack
technical expertise in cellular siting, local zoning boards struggle to keep
up with the deluge. 43 As a result, zoning boards become further inun-
dated with siting proposals. Congress simultaneously expects zoning
authorities to balance society's cellular needs with local land use needs.
Thus, while the provision results in additional siting proposals, it puts zon-
ing boards in no better position to handle these proposals.
This provision ultimately compels a local zoning board to accept into
its community an abundance of towers similarly constructed and perform-
ing the same function.'" Many local residents acknowledge the need for
cellular progress but consider multiple towers unnecessary and unjusti-
fied. 45 The competition fostered by the Act creates the potential of trans-
forming some communities into "antenna farms."' 46 Local opposition to
such a prospect likely will continue to surface. Thus, the provision only
increases the tremendous burden of settling the conflicting siting interests
that zoning authorities commonly encounter.
141. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036,
1038 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
142. See, e.g., id. at 1037. The city of Medina, Washington is a small com-
munity of approximately 3000 residents. The city rests on the eastern shore of
Lake Washington and is close to a major state highway and a floating bridge.
Consequently, the community's geographical location has caused Medina to be-
come a prime area for wireless telecommunications providers and has the poten-
tial to become an antenna farm. See id. Medina has received a flurry of applica-
tions for the issuance of special use permits for cellular tower erection. In fact,
due to the increase in demand for wireless communication, five different wireless
providers have expressed interest in constructing at least one facility in the city.
See id. at 1038. The Sprint Spectrum court addressed the fact that companies like
Sprint have entered the market more than ten years after other cellular providers
and now wish to match the coverage of the existing providers. The court implied
that as a result, companies like Sprint have inundated municipalities like Medina
with applications for permits and variances. See id. at 1040.
143. See id. at 1039.
144. See id. at 1037. In Sprint Spectrum, five cellular providers sought to lo-
cate one or more cell sites in the community, and additional requests were ex-
pected. See id. at 1038; see also Michael Levy, Zoning Board to Take Lead on Tower
Study, BUFFALO NEws, Oct. 16, 1996, at B5. Levy writes that citizens generally do
not oppose progress but do not like the idea of extra towers when another com-
munications tower is just 1000 feet away from the proposed cell tower. As one
citizen put it, "[O]ur neighborhood is going to look like a picket fence." Levy,
supra, at B5.
145. See Levy, supra note 144, at B5.
146. See Sprint Spectrum, 924 F. Supp. at 1037.
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B. The Reasonable Period Provision: Increasing the Pressure on
Local Governments
A state or local government must provide a timely and efficient re-
sponse to a provider's siting request. 4 7 This provision of the Act attempts
to provide a smooth and unburdened zoning process for a provider by
limiting the time zoning boards may spend deliberating the decision. 18 A
provider desires an expeditious zoning decision to facilitate business and
to prevent any delays that could allow a competitor to surpass the provider
in coverage. 4 9 Consequently, an expeditious zoning process can foster
competition by placing all cellular providers on a more level playing field.
Despite its benefits to the cellular provider, an expedited cellular
zoning process imposes a significant burden on local authorities. The
Act's legislative history indicates that a zoning board must render a deci-
sion in the "usual period" of time when the siting request involves a vari-
ance or a public hearing. The siting of cellular towers, however, is not a
"usual" zoning procedure.'' Therefore, the usual period of time for vari-
ances and public hearings is insufficient for local authorities to render a
reasoned decision on tower siting proposals. The Act fails to accommo-
date the needs of local zoning boards, which deal with numerous propos-
als concerning an unexplored and complicated zoning issue.
In addition, the provision fails to define a "reasonable period of• ,,152
time. Because this provision has been in effect for a little over a year,
no case law guides zoning boards in making this determination. Local
zoning boards thus have a great deal of discretion in deciding what length
of time is reasonable. The nature of the cellular zoning issue to date sug-
gests that many interpretations will emerge. Consequently, cellular pro-
147. See47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7) (B) (ii) (West Supp. 1996).
148. See Sprint Spectrum, 924 F. Supp. at 1040. Despite Sprint's argument to
the contrary, the Sprint Spectrum court concluded that requiring action within a
reasonable period of time does not force local governments onto a rigid timetable
if the situation requires time for inspection, research, and deliberation. To hold
that the six-month moratorium was not a reasonable period of time, in the court's
view, would afford preferential treatment to the cellular provider. See id.
149. See id. Sprint argued that Medina's moratorium unreasonably dis-
criminated against it in violation of the Act. Sprint also requested that it be
placed in the same position as the earlier entrants. Although the Act requires ex-
peditious determinations to promote competition, the court concluded that
Medina cannot place Sprint in the same position as the earlier entrants. The Act
simply does not go that far to promote competition. Id.
150. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 207-09, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 121, 221-23.
151. See generally supra Part III.
152. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). Few moratoria have been imple-
mented for study and deliberation on cellular siting since the passage of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. Thus, there is little precedent to aid construction of
the phrase, "a reasonable period of time." Id.
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viders likely will challenge the varying moratoria periods they encounter
because the differing time periods will appear to be based on arbitrary dis-
tinctions.' At the same time, zoning boards will implement moratoria
based on their interpretation of the standard, uncertain whether their de-
cisions will spawn protracted litigation.'54
For example, in Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, the court ac-
cepted six months as an appropriate moratorium on Sprint's zoning pro-
posal.' In Sprint Spectrum, the city of Medina, Washington, was reviewing
a large number of applications for zoning permits.1 6 The numerous pro-
posals suggest that Medina's situation was extraordinary and that the six-
month period might not be a reasonable period of time for a municipality
under less strenuous circumstances.1 7 An unduly long moratorium by a
zoning board facing fewer proposals may represent a barrier or prohibi-
153. See Sprint Spectrum, 924 F. Supp. at 1038. Sprint alleged that any delays
in obtaining full cellular coverage threatened it with irreparable financial harm.
The challenge to Medina's moratorium thus resulted. See id.
154. See id. at 1037. During the two-week period from November 17
through November 30, 1996, a number of moratoria were issued over cellular
siting. See, e.g., Jeffrey Brainard, District Is One Step from Historic Status, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 28, 1996, at 1; Chapple, supra note 12, at Al; County to
Control Antennae, But Not Mega-Hog Farms, PANTAGRAPH, Nov. 25, 1996, at A8; Dania
Buys Time on Towers - Zoning Laws Being Reviewed, SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 17, 1996, at
Al; Elisabeth Dunham, Unwanted Cell Tower May Move into View, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Nov. 21, 1996, at B04; East Side Briefly: Commission Vetoes Phone Tower,
SEArLE TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996, at B2; Bob Holliday, Towers Blocked for Half a Year,
PANTAGRAPH, Nov. 20, 1996, at A5; Mike Jackson, Pinellas Park Sets Antennae Plans,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996, at 8; Levy, supra note 12, at Al (stating that
"every community in Erie County either has a tower moratorium in place or is
considering it"); Meld Needs and Aesthetics in Cellular Tower Planning, PANTAGRAPH,
Nov. 27, 1996, at A10; Barbara O'Brien, Restrictions on Telecommunications Towers
Enacted, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 26, 1996, at B4; Susan Parrott, Edmond Approves Oil
Well, Tower, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 27, 1996, at 01; Jay Rey, Board Extends Cellular
Tower Moratorium, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 19, 1996, at B4; Adam C. Smith, Moratorium
on Towers Extended, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996, at 4B, 7B; James Vesely, A
Towering Confrontation That Defies Easy Resolution, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 18, 1996, at
B4; Terry Webster, Board OKs Moratorium on Building Permits for Towers, BUFFALO
NEWS, Nov. 26, 1996.
155. 924 F. Supp. at 1037.
156. Id.; see also Medina Applies Another Hold on Cell Towers, SEATTLE TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1996, at B2 (reporting that residents asked Medina city officials to chal-
lenge that part of the Act which requires cities to accept cellular towers within
their boundaries).
157. See Barrie Tabin, NLC Champions Cities' Authority in Cell Tower Siting,
NATION'S CITIES WKLY., Feb. 24, 1997, at 1. The Cellular Communications Indus-
try Association (CCIA) has filed a petition requesting the FCC to preempt the
ability of local governments to institute brief moratoria over applications for tower
siting permits. The National League of Cities (NLC) filed a response opposing
the CCIA's petition. The NLC argued that the Telecommunications Act requires
courts, not the FCC, to hear challenges to tower decisions. See id.
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tion to siting cellular towers. Conversely, a zoning board may have fewer
proposals to consider, but the board may regard those proposals as more
complicated than other zoning issues. That situation may warrant the six-
month moratorium established by Sprint Spectrum. In sum, Sprint Spectrum
does not clarify the reasonable time standard, thus leaving zoning board
moratoria open to challenge.
C. Environmental and Health Fears of Residents: Ignoring the Concerns?
The Act prohibits local authorities from regulating the location of a
cellular tower on the basis of environmental and health effects, provided
the proposed facilities comply with the FCC's regulations.1u In so doing,
Congress established a uniform environmental standard that applies to
cellular providers in every state. Cellular providers' siting proposals will
no longer be denied based on arbitrary environmental findings. This re-
duces the time and effort needed to ascertain, comply with, or contest a
local zoning board's unique environmental standard. Without this provi-
sion, a cellular provider would be subject to a wide range of environ-
mental standards, which would be inefficient and costly.
At the same time, this provision divests municipalities of a significant
defense against cellular tower construction. Local residents frequently
cite environmental hazards when opposing cellular tower siting within
their communities. The Act requires that the FCC standards be fol-
lowed.159 Nevertheless, environmental concerns about cellular towers have
not been totally disproved by FCC tests and standards.W' In fact, Congress
does not expect the final research report on electromagnetic fields
("EMF") and their effects on human health to be completed until Sep-
tember 30, 1997.61 The Act fails to quell fears over EMF health risks and
fails to address related concerns, such as diminished property values. 6 2 As
a result, local residents fearing the loss of property values will continue to
pressure zoning boards to deny tower proposals, thereby slowing the zon-
ing process. Thus, the provision fails to alleviate the existing conflict be-
tween local residents and cellular providers.
158. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iv) (West Supp. 1996).
159. See id.
160. See supra notes 39, 126 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 39, 126 and accompanying text.
162. See Neighbors Opposed to the Tower v. Connection Siting Council, No.
CV 960557602S, 1996 WL 409320, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 1996). De-
fendant Springwich Cellular Limited Partnership was granted a certificate to con-
struct a 180 foot cellular tower and associated equipment. On appeal, plaintiffs
Neighbors Opposed to the Tower alleged that the construction of the tower low-
ered their property values and interfered with their right to enjoy their property.
Id. at *2. The court did not rule on this issue, however, because the plaintiffs had
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before appealing. Id.
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D. Providing Expedited Judicial Review: Facilitating Competition or
Encouraging Litigation?
A cellular provider may pursue an expedited judicial hearing when
dissatisfied with a zoning decision or when a zoning board has failed to act
on a proposal.16 - An expedited appeal process promotes competition by
securing an immediate second determination for providers, who invest
considerable time and expense in developing cellular tower siting propos-
als. Providing ajudicial appeal from a delayed zoning decision also fosters
competition by encouraging timely zoning decisions.1M
Expedited review ultimately undermines the authoritative power of
zoning board decisions. Such a process merely invites cellular providers to
bring suit when a zoning decision is delayed or is unfavorable. Because
cellular providers base their site proposals on technological strategy and
economic expense,1 65 a judicial appeal may seem the easier and more eco-
nomical alternative to a provider when the zoning board has denied the
original site proposal. For the zoning board, the appeals process can con-
tinue indefinitely as each provider seeks expedited judicial action. Thus,
although the provision fosters competition among cellular providers, it
leaves the zoning board virtually powerless and places the board in an in-
definite zoning battle.
The Act successfully acknowledges consumer need by promoting
competition. However, the Act's failure to forge a reasonable truce in the
cellular war counters such success. A collocation amendment would offer
the reasonable truce lacking in the existing Act. In short, a collocation
amendment would advance the need for developing a cellular infrastruc-
ture, but would also dissipate the existing conflicts and ease administrative
strain on state and local zoning boards.
VII. CAN'T WE ALLJUST GET ALONG?
THE COLLOCATION ALTERNATIVE
The cellular industry has experienced tremendous growth in recent
years as cellular phones have become an accepted communication me-
dium.'6 To satisfy the explosive demand for cellular service, cellular pro-
viders attempt to construct towers at a corresponding pace. 67 Not surpris-
ingly, consumer demand for universal cellular coverage has precipitated
an influx of new cellular providers into metropolitan markets."'8 With
163. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (v) (West Supp. 1996).
164. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
166. See El Nasser, supra note 4, at A3.
167. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
168. See Chuck Jones, Shared Cell Sites, CELLULAR Bus., Aug. 1993, at 18, 19.
In the first 10 years of service, cellular providers distinguished themselves primar-
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such expansion of cellular services, providers entering established markets
must compete against existing and unwelcoming providers.1 9 As a result,
the new providers search for tower locations that provide reception at a
level competitive with or superior to existing providers."70 Cellular towers
thus have begun to dot the landscape of America's cities.17 ' Therefore, the
Act must strike a balance between fostering competition and controlling
the growth of cellular towers. An amendment requiring collocation of cel-
lular towers provides that necessary balance.
ily by covering a particular neighborhood. Such "territorial claims" yield large
numbers of new customers for a cell provider. As a result, a single cellular site
enabled a provider to monopolize a particular market and to generate a signifi-
cant revenue statement on that market as well. Initial cellular siting was critical
for cellular providers attempting to establish themselves in the cellular market, as
such standing rarely was challenged by competing cell providers. See id.
169. See id. at 19. The early days of cellular service provided cell siting on
existing constructs, such as radio facilities, building rooftops and commercial or
industrial areas along primary traffic routes. The process of siting these cellular
facilities was lengthy and expensive due to "start-up learning curves, resource con-
straints, education of zoning and planning jurisdictions, federal or state regula-
tions and, often, equipment delivery." Id. In addition, providers intended for
these originating sites to serve a large diametric area, which allowed them flexibil-
ity in their site searches. Thus, such factors as land availability, lease/purchase
economics, zoning constraints, and ground elevation were not critical problems in
the early years of cellular siting. However, providing equivalent or superior cov-
erage requires construction of new and numerous cellular towers. See id.
In contrast to the original cellular sites, the new sites promise higher quality
and critical capacity. Possible locations for cellular sites are diminishing in num-
ber, ultimately reducing the providers' flexibility in determining a proposed loca-
tion. See id.; see also Chapple, supra note 12, at Al (asserting that "when it comes
to radio towers for cellular telephones, federal deregulation means local prolif-
eration"); Julie Carr Smyth, Telephone Industry Gets More Crowded, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany, N.Y.), Nov. 20, 1996, at El (pointing out that the freedom afforded to cellu-
lar providers by the Act has precipitated an increase in cellular competition; the
"providers of old," such as AT&T, MCI Communications Inc., Nynex Corp., and
Sprint Communications Inc., have now entered each other's markets). As evi-
dence of this potential proliferation, Chapple notes that the FCC has recently is-
sued a number of new licenses for cellular telephone companies seeking to com-
pete in the telecommunications market. As a result, these new companies are
"moving quickly to erect towers." Chapple, supra note 12, at Al. According to the
Erie County Planning Director, new players in the area, such as Sprint Spectrum,
are attempting to develop in one year a cellular network that took existing pro-
viders, such as Cellular One, a decade to build. Such hurried attempts have cre-
ated a "lot of the stress" on the area. Levy, supra note 12, at Al.
170. SeeJones, supra note 168, at 19. Territorial claim on a service area was
a brief phenomenon. As society's need for cellular service escalated, so did com-
petition. Emerging competitors soon attempted to match - and then attempted
to exceed - the coverage area provided by existing cellular providers. See id.
171. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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A collocation1 72 amendment to the Act would require competing cel-
lular providers to share the same cellular tower when technologically fea-
sible."' Fortunately, "where sites are needed the most has never been a
mystery," so cellular providers intending to collocate generally would not
encounter significant technological challenges.1 74 Collocation, however,
does accommodate the needs of several cellular providers. Determining
the precise location of a collocated cellular tower, therefore, could require
some deference by state and local zoning authorities."'
Collocation compels cellular providers to combine their siting efforts.
As a result, providers must work with each other and must arrive at an
agreement to govern their shared occupancy. A collocation agreement
between cellular providers could take multiple forms. Specifically, collo-
cating providers could structure the agreement as a lease, a sublease, or a
176license. Regardless of the form selected, the collocation agreement
should address facility construction, operation, and maintenance, as well
as any business concerns associated with collocation.7
B. Municipal Benefits
Municipal residents would reap many benefits under a collocation
plan. First, constructing only one tower shared by multiple providers
would reduce local anxiety over aesthetic considerations. Collocation
would quell local fears of cellular tower proliferation and the potential
172. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 446 (3d ed. 1986)
(defining "collocate" as "to set or arrange in a place or position;... to set side by
side").
173. See Snyder, supra note 21, at 70. Collocation would not be feasible
when it creates frequency interference, known as intermodulation, or where a gap
in signal coverage exists. See id.
174. SeeJones, supra note 168, at 20. Primary coverage areas are determined
by geographic and market statistics. Also, consumer traffic data determine the
number of channels needed for a particular site. Jones asserts that collocation
implementation would be based on "logical factors of coverage market criteria
and agreed upon between the carriers." Id.
175. See Evans v. Shore Communications, 685 A.2d 454, 457 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996). Shore Communications proposed to construct a cellular tower on
which it intended to collocate multiple cellular providers. Shore Communica-
tions described the process of selecting a site to collocate as "very delicate" be-
cause it accommodates the various needs of the tower's users. See id.
176. See Snyder, supra note 21, at 70. Under a lease agreement, the lessee
gains the right to place its antenna on a tower or building that already hosts a
number of antennas. Under a sublease agreement, the sublessee gains the right
to place its antenna on a tower that already has been leased by a primary cellular
provider. Under a license agreement, occupancy on the existing cellular tower is
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conversion of their communities into "antenna farms." 78 Second, colloca-
tion would minimize health concerns as fewer cellular towers would enter
residential areas. Third, collocation would better serve the environment
and promote a less-commercial quality of life. Fourth, local frustration di-
rected at cellular providers would subside since fewer towers would result
in less intrusion into the community. Eased frustration may encourage
local zoning boards to apply "public utility" status to the teamed providers,
a much lower and desired standard for providers.
C. Cellular Provider Benefits
A collocation requirement would provide a number of benefits for
cellular providers as well. Cellular providers ultimately would save money
under a collocation requirement. First, construction of a cellular tower
requires significant funds. Providers currently spend a great deal of
money simply duplicating other providers' siting efforts.179 A shared effort
would reduce the financial demands of erecting a cellular tower. Second,
"frequency licensing, tower clearance approval[,] and local zoning per-
mission" would no longer delay cellular providers. 18° Collocation would
decrease the likelihood of delays that presently result from numerous
tower zoning proposals. Cellular providers would avoid the frustration of
zoning decisions that are based on constituent influence rather than zon-
ing policies and regulations.18 Third, collocation would allow providers to
satisfy the needs of subscribers in a larger service area which, in turn,
would boost revenue. 1
2
D. Zoning Board Benefits
A collocation requirement would ease the administrative strain on
local zoning boards. Zoning boards have become inundated with propos-
als from cellular providers. As a result, zoning boards have been forced to
delve into a new area of zoning without much guidance. As discussed pre-
viously, Congress, through the Act, has forced local authorities to deal
178. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036, 1037
(W.D. Wash. 1996).
179. SeeJones, supra note 168, at 19.
180. F. Kim Goryance, The Changing Landscape of Cell Sites, CELLULAR Bus.,
May 1994, at 21, 24.
181. See DEEMs &JENNETrE, supra note 20, § 1.01[2], at 1-8. Local constitu-
ents often influence zoning board decisions. The fact that zoning boards often
consider proposals in light of the "broader contexts of the community," rather
than strictly applying zoning regulations and guidelines, further hinders the pro-
vider's cause. Thus, an application which appears to comply with the zoning
regulations and procedures may be denied because its proposal is unpopular with
constituents. See id.
182. See Goryance, supra note 180, at 24.
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with cellular towers, but it has not equipped them with the means to con-
trol their growth. 83 Zoning boards often react by issuing moratoria to bat-
tle the flood of tower proposals. A collocation requirement would simplify
the administrative process for zoning boards by decreasing the number of
proposals. A more efficient and cost-effective administrative process bene-
fits the municipality and the cellular provider.
E. Development of the Cellular Infrastructure
Collocation can provide benefits to cellular providers, municipal
residents, and zoning boards without abandoning the purpose of the Act.
The Act seeks to encourage private investment, promote and protect
competition, increase access to the "Information Superhighway," promote
universal service, and provide flexibility to regulators.
1 84
Collocation would continue to encourage private investment. Collo-
cation diminishes expense for cellular providers, and consequently, it
would encourage investments that would not occur without the cost-
efficiency of collocation. Collocation would continue to promote compe-
tition as providers would distinguish themselves by customer care, pricing,
and enhanced services, rather than by coverage and reception accom-
plished only through duplicated cellular towers. Collocation would con-
tinue to provide access to information and universal service because the
18sites, though shared, would preserve premium coverage. Finally, collo-
cation would not infringe upon regulation flexibility.
Requiring providers to collocate falls within the scope of authority of
local governments. States maintain police power over land use regula-
tion.188 Most states authorize local governments to exercise this power.",9
183. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (B) (West Supp. 1996).
184. See Symposium, supra note 135, at 543.
185. See supra Part VII.C.
186. SeeJones, supra note 168, at 20.
187. See id.
188. The Constitution mentions nothing about police power, but its exer-
cise was reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). Police power is defined as the "authority to regulate private activity,
including the use and development of land, for the protection of the public
health, safety and welfare." DEEMS & JENNE1TE, supra note 20, § 1.03[1], at 1-25.
189. See DEEMS &JENNETE, supra note 20, § 1.02[1], at 1-13. Local govern-
ments do not possess inherent police power; only states have this power. There
must be some type of legislation or constitutional delegation of authority from the
state to the local government. Without a delegation of police power, local gov-
ernments cannot regulate land use through zoning ordinances. Most local gov-
ernments acquire their power to regulate land use from enabling legislation that
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Local governments use their police power to prevent and resolve land use
conflicts, a primary goal of zoning law. 90 In so doing, local governments
attempt to balance the competing interests of landowners and those in-
tending to develop neighboring property.'9' Some local governments have
attempted to strike such a balance by encouraging collocation of cellular
towers. 192 The collocation of facilities historically has been viewed as a lo-cal zoing .193
cal zoning prerogative. Yet, attempts to encourage collocation generally
have failed because of competition between cellular providers.9 4 Conse-
quently, without government intervention, collocation remains a largely
unexplored option.
195
The failure of local governments to require collocation contravenes
the traditional notion that local governments govern and control land use.
However, the federal government can preempt a state's police power and
exercise control over land use when the use is "important to the health,
safety and general welfare of the nation as a whole." 196 The Act preempted
local governments' power to ban cellular towers within their communi-
ties.' 97 It also preempted local governments' ability to deal with the "po-
litically sensitive" issue of EMF radiation that allegedly emanates from cel-
lular towers.'9"
190. Seeid.§ 1.0[1],atl-3to-4.
191. See id. § 1.01[1], at 1-3.
192. See Snyder, supra note 21, at 69. Snyder supports the collocation of cel-
lular towers, arguing that local zoning boards have "made collocation an integral
part of the antenna siting equation." Id.
193. See id.
194. See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036,
1038 (W.D. Wash. 1996) ("All efforts by the City [of Medina] to date to encourage
co-location [sic] have been rejected by wireless providers."); see also Tony Angelo,
Brookfield to Get 2 Cellular Towers: Companies Were Unable to Work out Terms for Joint
Use of One Tower, MILWAUIEEJ. & SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 1996 (reporting that two cellu-
lar phone towers would be constructed instead of one because the competing
companies could not agree on terms for sharing a tower owned by one of them);
Levy, supra note 12, at Al (reporting that a new city ordinance required cell pro-
viders to document attempts to collocate because cell providers competing for the
same potential customers had not been friendly to the idea of collocation). The
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association has stated, "Companies are
very aware of the resistance and they don't come in to a community to make
enemies. The first thing they'll look for are existing water towers, tall buildings.
Residential areas are the last choice." El Nasser, supra note 4, at 3A.
195. See Steward, supra note 9, at 78, 82. According to Roy Moore, vice
president of FWT, a manufacturer of cellular towers, "[Y]ou're going to have two
people together who don't like each other and don't want to talk to each other.
Without government intervention, [collocation] won't happen." Id.
196. DEEMS &JENNETrE, supra note 20, § 1.03[2], at 1-28. Congress derives
such power primarily from the Constitution's interstate commerce clause. See id.
197. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c) (7) (A) (West Supp. 1996).
198. Seeid. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iv).
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CELLULAR TOWER SITING
More significantly, Congress preempted local zoning power over wire
communications, such as traditional wire phone use.' 99 Like the 1996 Act,
wire collocation was implemented to foster competition and to provide
greater access to information.n The FCC contended that increased com-
petition would also reduce prices for available services.20' Wire collocation
requirements have passed constitutional muster and have not been re-
202garded as a taking. As a result, many local zoning authorities have ques-
tioned why cellular providers cannot collocate their cellular towers just as
wire providers have collocated electrical systems through shared utility
poles.203 The collocation of wire services can serve as an effective model
for the collocation of cellular services.
The competing interests of cellular providers and local residents and
the proliferation of cellular towers necessitates a collocation amendment
to the Act. More significantly, a collocation amendment would ease the
administrative strain resulting from cellular providers' competition for
new tower sites. Federal preemption is necessary because local govern-
ments have been unsuccessful at encouraging collocation themselves.
199. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (c) (4) (B) (6) (West
Supp. 1996). The Act imposes a
duty to provide, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory, for physical collocation of equipment necessary
for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements at the
premises of the local exchange carrier, except that the carrier may pro-
vide for virtual collocation if the local exchange carrier demonstrates to
the State commission that physical collocation is not practical for techni-
cal reasons or because of space limitations.
Id.
200. See Leonard M. Baynes, A Derailment on the Information Superhighway:
Desperately Seeking to Avoid Paying Compensation - A Case Study of Special Access Collo-
cation and Its Invalidation, in Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441
(D.C. Cir. 1994), 21 U. DAYrON L. REv. 417, 424-25 (1996) (discussing the impor-
tance of collocation to spark competition within the telephone industry). But see
Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and Telecommunications Policy:
A Fostering of Competition on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 263, 263 (1991-1992)
(questioning whether collocation will foster more efficient competition).
201. See Baynes, supra note 200, at 425.
202. See Leonard M. Baynes, Swerving to Avoid the "Takings" and "Ultra Vires"
Potholes on the Information Superhighway: Is the New York Collocations and Telecommu-
nications Policy a Taking Under the New York Public Service Law?, 18 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. LJ. 51, 79-81 (1995). Wire collocation does not diminish the value of the
property to such a degree that it constitutes a taking. Telephone companies have
argued that such regulation interferes with the landowner's investment-backed
expectations. However, the relevant space is usually "spare, unused," and the
telephone company will receive rent for such space that would otherwise have
been economically unproductive. Economic regulation has been regarded as
"very routine" and is not unconstitutional unless the property is confiscated with-
out any rational basis for doing so. See id.
203. See Jones, supra note 168, at 19 (arguing that collocation of cellular
services should follow the path of collocated wire services).
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With a collocation amendment, municipal residents would control the in-
flux of cellular towers into their communities, and local governments
would retain authority to make cellular tower siting decisions. Local gov-
ernments likely would support such a preemption of their police power.
In addition, collocation would provide administrative and financial bene-
fits to cellular providers and would continue to promote the Act's goals.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 promotes competition and
the development of the cellular infrastructure necessary to satisfy society's
communication needs. Competition for cellular tower sites, however, has
come with a price: Cellular providers have inundated zoning boards with
tower proposals. Zoning boards thus face the tremendous task of control-
ling the rapid growth of the cellular infrastructure. These boards must
accommodate the demands of a competitive cellular system while main-
taining effective local land use. The Act, however, failed to equip zoning
authorities with the means to perform this required balancing act. As a
result, the Act fails to solve and only exacerbates the conflicts inherent in
cellular siting.
A collocation amendment for cellular siting would assist in balancing
the competing interests of providers and municipalities, while easing the
administrative burden on state and local zoning boards. Collocation
would moderate the pace at which cellular towers would be constructed
and would allay residents' fears that "antenna farms" will develop in their
communities. Collocation would provide financial benefits to cellular
providers while meeting the Act's goal of encouraging competition
through services rather than coverage. Collocation also would generate
fewer zoning proposals, resulting in more efficient, economical, and rea-
soned decisions.
The Act was expected to keep pace with society's accelerated com-
munication needs, and it did. As American society clamors for swifter
travel on the cellular superhighway, that speed must be limited to prevent
any further collisions from taking place. The cellular superhighway, of
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